This article examines the policy and institutional frameworks for response to and man-made 15 disasters occurring in the Danube basin and the Tisza sub-basin. Response to these types of 16 incidents has historically been managed separately, as has the monitoring of these types of 17 incidents. Given policy distinctions in response to natural and man-made disasters, we discuss 18 whether the distinctions remain functional given recent international trends toward holistic 19 response to both natural and man-made disasters. We suggest that these distinctions are 20 counterproductive, outdated, and ultimately flawed and conclude with a reflection of the lessons 21 learned, and propose an integrated framework in the Danube basin and Tisza sub-basin. 22 23
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Introduction 40
What are the benefits of maintaining the distinction between natural and man-made 41 disasters? What are the consequences of eliminating this distinction? When a disaster occurs, 42 local and national capacities can be overwhelmed, often triggering a request for external, 43 international assistance. The actors engaged in disaster response have historically been 44 determined by the nature of the disaster (i.e., industrial accidents, nuclear accidents, marine oil 45 spills); but with growing recognition that anthropogenic climate change is driving more extreme, 46
and sometimes cascading events (e.g., where the effects of disasters are multiplied, or where they 47 are composite, or concurrent) that require complex and often overlapping types of response, the 48 question of eliminating this dichotomy is brought to the forefront. 49
In Europe, natural and man-made disasters combined caused total losses of US$ 13 50 billion in 2015 of which only US$ 6 billion were insured; the predominant losses came from 51 flood events (Swiss . Flooding and pollution are considered to be the primary 52 transboundary pressures of the Danube River basin; however, a number of other man-made 53 accidents occurred in the region (ICPDR, 2015a) . and regulation of river levels for navigation. The operation of these dams for these services has 120 been attributed with altering the flow regime of this segment of river and consequently varying 121 the ecological disturbance regime within the river and on the floodplain resulting is substantial 122 changes in the riverine ecosystem. The flow regulation provided by the dams and the 123 construction of levees has allowed for the conversion of floodplains and riverine wetlands into 124 area suitable for agricultural and urban development. Today only 12 small reaches (<1 km in 125 length) of the Upper Danube relatively remain untransformed (Schneider, 2010) . In the Middle 126
and Lower Danube, the river bed has been dredged repeatedly to maintain a navigable river 127 channel. Along these segments of the Danube River, levees and dams mitigate or prevent 128 inundation of over 72 percent of the floodplain. The substantial reduction is Danube's connection 129 with its floodplain combined with wastewater discharge from agricultural and industrial sources, 130 and increasing levels of pollutants along these river segments have substantially altered or 131 damaged riverine ecosystem and reduced resiliency of urban and rural communities to large 132 floods which exceed the protection level of their flood mitigation measures (Schneider, 2010 Baia Borsa natech accidents. Natech accidents present significant challenges, as natural events 161 can trigger multiple and simultaneous accidents in one installation, or depending on the impact 162 of the natural hazard, in several hazardous facilities at the same time (Krausmann and Baranzini, 163 2012 only those from currently operational mines. Therefore, the potential risk of accidental pollution 166 could be substantially higher (ICPDR, 2015a). 167
Methodology 168
The analysis of policy and institutional frameworks for monitoring and responding to 169 natural disasters and man-made accidents in the Danube River basin and Tisza River sub-basin 170 was conducted through a combination of primary and secondary data collection and analysis. 171
The primary data collection and analysis consisted of semi-structured interviews, while the 172 secondary data analysis included literature review of peer-reviewed publications and an analysis 173 of international laws, policies, and institutions within the Danube basin and Tisza sub-basin. 174
Semi-structured interviews were conducted over an eight-month period from January to August 175
176
Seventy-one interviews were conducted in various locations throughout Europe. The 177 interviews took place with experts working within the International Commission for the 178 Protection of the Danube River, within the expert groups of the International Commission for the 179 Protection of the Danube River (i.e., Tisza group, river basin management, flood protection, and 180 accident prevention and control), with respondents working at the national ministries, water 181 management directorates, and non-governmental organizations in the Tisza and Danube 182 countries, as well as with experts working within the European Commission, and the United 183 Nations involved in the Danube basin and Tisza sub-basin. Given public roles, the interviews are 184 intentionally left anonymous to ensure candidness in the responses (Table 1 
Rationale for different treatment 221 222
The manner in which disasters are framed by society has evolved over time, still the role 223 of human responsibility features prominently in disaster narratives. Natural disasters are 224 naturally occurring physical phenomena, which can include earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, 225 volcanoes and floods. Natural disasters have historically been characterized either (1) as a direct 226 form of punishment from God for the sins of humanity, or (2) more recently as an "act of God" 227 that removed humans from culpability (Rozario, 2007) . The framing of natural disasters 228 continues to shift, and some natural events -earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis -only become 229 disasters as they impact and interact with individuals and communities. The consequences of 230 natural disasters become a function of where people reside -along coastlines, in floodplains, in 231 vicinity of fault lines, and within mountainous regions -and their overall vulnerability, including 232 aging infrastructure and a function of their ability to monitor and prepare for these events. 233
Vulnerability within and between populations can vary, and occur for multiple reasons -social 234 inequalities, community demographics (e.g., age and poverty), lack of access to health care, and 235 limited access to jobs or to lifelines (e.g., emergency response, goods, services) (Cutter and 236 Emrich, 2006) . While building in disaster-prone areas is not the sole responsibility of 237 individuals, they do share responsibility for investing in the risk involved. The existence of moral 238 hazard 2 can increase the amount of damage from disaster and reduce the capacity of insurance to 239 cover disaster loss; this occurs due to individuals acting irresponsibly and because of those who 240 erroneously believe there is coverage for any loss incurred (Smith, 2013 (Cutter and Emrich, 2006) . 256
Industrial accidents and other man-made accidents are traditionally considered separately 257 from natural disasters. The role of human agency features even more prominently in these 258 events, due to potential moral or legal obligations to mitigate risk (e.g., preparedness, insurance, 259 disaster aid). Man-made disasters suggest potential moral and legal obligations to both aid the 260 victims of the disaster in a response capacity in the period immediately following the disaster, as 261 well as to compensate those who are harmed during their long-term recovery (Verchick, 2012) . 262
The liability is only effective if a polluter can be identified or liability can be assigned. As 263 disasters continue to multiply, become more complex, and their costs mount, responsibility for 264 the disaster also becomes more complex. For example, in assigning liability to the 2010 red 265 sludge spill in Hungary, early reports from the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán indicated 266 that the breach was likely due to human error, and that "there was no sign the disaster was 267 caused by natural causes, therefore it must be caused by people" (Dunai, 2010) . In ongoing 268 efforts to determine human negligence, it was determined that flooding and subsidence led to 269 structural breaches in the reservoir containing the alumina, yet it remained difficult to prove 270 whether officials at the MAL alumina facility knew of the weakened infrastructure (NDGDM, 271
2010). 272
The degree of uncertainty related to the amount of damage and probability of occurrence 273 is very high with disasters, particularly those influenced by climate change (Greiving et al., 274 2012; Munich Re, 2016). Liability can be more difficult to calculate and assign in these cases, in 275 part because disaster loss agencies (i.e., Munich Re, Swiss Re), are often accounting for specific 276 losses from flooding and sudden-onset disasters that are more easily quantified, whereas the 277 impact of slow-onset, or "silent", disasters related to climate change can be more difficult to 278 quantify since they occur slowly over time (IFRC, 2013) . or whether occurring suddenly or as the result of complex, long-term processes). However, the 300 ability to provide disaster response for natural disasters is quite broad and is included in a 301 number of international frameworks. A question of applicability of agreements arises, however, 302 when a complex disaster occurs and multiple institutions have a mandate for response, but it is 303 unclear which institution should take the lead in responding or coordinating response efforts 304 . During the Lebanon crisis in 2006, international assistance was requested in 305 response to the bombing of fuel storage tanks at a power station, and over 70 countries and 306 organizations responded -it was unclear who should take lead, and the need for coordination 307 was reflected among response efforts (Nijenhuis, 2014) . the decision to offer assistance, the type of assistance provided, and the terms of assistance are 314 up to the discretion of the non-state actors offering assistance . Given the 315 increasing role of private funds in disaster response and relief operations, considering the 316 inclusion of these actors in disaster frameworks can be beneficial. Oftentimes, there is the 317 assumption that assets and personnel are provided as a favor to an affected state government, 318
where they might normally be expected to reimburse costs and manage how assistance is carried 319 out. However, efforts are increasingly being made to clarify the respective roles of actors and 320 institutions in regard to disaster response, and more recently laws are changing in favor of 321 including broader terminology to comprise both natural and man-made disasters (IFRC, 2007) . 322
Disaster frameworks in the Danube and Tisza 323
Response to natural and man-made disasters, including natech accidents, is governed by a 324 range of global, regional and national laws, policies and soft-law instruments. In the Danube 325 basin and Tisza sub-basin this includes the Industrial Accidents Convention and the Seveso 326 Accident, and recent Serbian landslides). These are tallied in Table 2 . However, the frameworks 345 for disaster response at the levels of the United Nations, the European Union, and those utilized 346 by the ICPDR and implemented at the national level by the Danube countries, are restricted to 347 particular types of disaster -monitoring and response to flooding is the most advanced 348 throughout the basin, while pollution is monitored, but does not have the same frameworks for 349 
How disasters are treated differently within response frameworks 355
In the absence of a centralized institution for disaster response, the development of a 356 large and diverse international disaster relief community has occurred. Initially the large-scale 357 relief work after natural disasters was undertaken by the Red Cross movement at the end of the 358 slow-onset and sudden-onset disasters, they can create cumulative impacts to the community that 399 increase vulnerability and lead to larger disasters in the future -precipitation deficiencies in soil 400
and water lead to drought and when combined with high temperatures and dry conditions, this 401 can lead to wildfires (e.g., extreme fire hazard situations in the eastern US and south-east 402 Australia) (Smith, 2013) . 403
The growing size and diversity of international responders to disasters can have 404 ramifications for the facilitation, coordination, and quality of response efforts (IFRC, 2007) . Transboundary floods typically affect larger areas, can be more severe, result in a higher number 570 of deaths, and cause increased economic loss than non-transboundary rivers (Baaker, 2009) . 571
Therefore, the repeated occurrence of such large, costly flood events (Table 3) While "natural" disasters may be a commonly used term, no disaster can be regarded as 610 entirely natural if people have the capacity to avoid, mitigate, or reduce the risk from an entirely 611 natural hazard (Picard, 2016) . However, the vulnerability to lives and livelihoods can be avoided 612 There is an additional shift in what is considered truly a natural disaster as well -not only 616 from the perspective of mitigation or vulnerability, but in acknowledgement of the anthropogenic 617 influences on natural disasters. Climate change is one aspect, but there are also induced 618 earthquakes occurring as a result of slipping faults from fluid injection in hydraulic fracturing 619 (Legere, 2016) and from the weight of shifting water impoundments from Three Gorges (Stone, 620 2008), landslides from subsidence and increased land use activities including urbanization 621 (Smith, 2013) , and pandemics from deforestation and habitat conversion (Greger, 2007) , to name 622 a few. Holistic frameworks that include multiple types of disasters are needed in order to respond 623 effectively. 624
Human intervention in the physical environment exposes populations to natural hazards 625 from the built environment, such as housing and associated infrastructure, including industrial 626 facilities, drainage works, and planning-especially when the built environment is not 627 appropriately designed or built to account for the risks. Human, economic, and environmental 628 losses can be worse in highly populated, urbanized areas; with increased urbanization and 629 climate change, they are placed at increased risk to natural and man-made hazards (Bruch and The transition toward a multi-hazard approach for response to natural and man-made 678 disasters, and the acknowledgement of the risks of natech accidents is occurring at many levels. 679
It is present in the work of the United Nations and the multilevel response frameworks of the EU 680
Civil Protection Mechanism; some regional agencies are also adopting similar agreements (i.e., 681 
Multi-hazard approaches 687
The process of building holistic approaches to planning, preparedness, and response can 688 strengthen systems for responding to natural and man-made disasters in a more integrated 689 manner. Building holistic disaster risk management processes may be done at the global (e.g., 690
Sendai), regional (e.g., BSEC), bilateral, and national levels. 691
The review of legal and policy frameworks and interviews reflected that while some 692 planning and preparedness activities take place regarding flood hazard, this generally is not the 693 
